By: Steven I. Friedland In Fourth Amendment decisions, different concepts, facts and assumptions about reality are often tethered together by vocabulary and fact, creating a ‘Stickiness Principle.’ In particular, form and function historically were considered indistinguishable, not as separate factors. For example, “containers” carried things, “watches” told time, and “phones” were used to make voice calls. Advancing technology, though, began to fracture this identity and the broader Stickiness Principle. In June 2014, Riley v. California and its companion case, United States v. Wurie, offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to begin untethering form and function and dismantling the Stickiness Principle. Riley presented the question of whether cell phone searches incident to a lawful arrest were constitutional. The Court, which had clung to pre-digital concepts such as physical trespass well into the twenty-first century, appeared ready to explore how technology is reshaping historically understood conceptions of privacy. From a broader perspective, the case offers an initial step in reconciling pre-digital rules based on outdated spatial conceptions of physical things with the changing realities of a technology driven world. Download Full Article (PDF) Cite: 14 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 121
Tag: Constitutional Law
Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard: The First Amendment Right to Use a Historical Figure’s Likeness in Video Games
By: Joshua Sinclair Panama’s former dictator, Manuel Noriega, recently sued Activision Blizzard in the California Superior Court for using his likeness and image in the popular video game “Call of Duty: Black Ops II.” In his complaint, Noriega alleged that the use of his likeness violated his right of publicity. Former New York Mayor, Rudy Giuliani, came to Activision’s defense, and filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted. In granting Activision’s motion, the court held that Activision’s use of Noriega’s likeness was transformative and did not violate his right of publicity. This Issue Brief argues that the California Superior Court should not have applied the transformative use test but should have held that Manuel Noriega did not have a right of publicity for his place in Panama’s history. Download Full Article (PDF) Cite: 14 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 69
The Constitutionality and Legality of Internet Voting Post-Shelby County
By: Logan T. Mohs The technological and electoral landscapes have changed drastically since the turn of the century. While it once might have made sense to view voting online as unconstitutional, as opposed to merely impractical, the expanded range of Internet access for minority communities has made that argument tenuous at best. While there still may exist practical and political reasons to avoid Internet voting, the Constitution no longer stands as an effective wall against the practice. Furthermore, the primary statutory obstacle to the implementation of Internet voting on a local level, the Voting Rights Act, has been greatly weakened by the recent Supreme Court decision in Shelby County. As such, now is the perfect time for state-level experimentation in the field of Internet voting. Download Full Article (PDF) Cite: 13 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 181